Introduction
There was a great deal of speculative analysis and commentary immediately following the defeat of the republic referendum of 6 November 1999, and in this paper I use data from the Australian Constitutional Referendum Study 1999 (Gow, Bean and McAllister 2000) , hereafter referred to as ACRS99, to provide empirical assessments of some of the most important questions about the failure of the referendum proposal to be passed. I begin by dealing with one of the key issues identi ed by Irving (2000) : that of whether the defeat of the referendum indicates a desire not to change the Constitution or whether it indicates a preference for a direct-election method of selecting the head of state.
This obviously has implications for future developments and processes. So too does another important (and perhaps related) question, that of whether the existence of (at least) three options (the existing situation; parliamentary appointment of a President; direct election of a President) could lead to a 'cyclical majority' David Charnock is an AssociateProfessorin the School of Social Sciencesat Curtin University.He thanks this journal's anonymous reviewers for useful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and Kay Fisher for her help in producing the information in some of the tables. The work was partially supported by Australian Research Council Large Grant A79938063.
outcome, where none of the options is capable of obtaining a majority because adherents of the remaining options will combine to ensure its defeat. Based on close examination of the ACRS99 responses, I argue that this is unlikely and that any future successful republican outcome is most likely to involve some form of directly elected President.
In addition to there having been a clear overall majority in favour of having a directly elected President, almost half of these direct electionists were not prepared to support the parliamentary-appointment option offered in the referendum. It was essentially the votes of this subgroup (in conjunction with those preferring to retain the existing arrangements) that led to the defeat. Since this group played such a signi cant part in defeating the referendum proposal, it is crucial to have an understanding of the factors that differentiated them from those who preferred direct election but who nevertheless voted 'Yes'.
Most of the rest of the article is spent discussing suggested differentiating factors, including giving an especially extensive discussion of the role of national identity that builds on some of the survey work on Australian national identity that has been carried out in recent years.
Head of State Preferences
A starting point for much of the commentary on the outcome of the referendum has been the obvious discrepancy between its outcome and the opinion polls that consistently showed an overwhelming majority of voters (in the order of 60-70%) in support of becoming a republic. The head of state preferences of voters are a key factor in examining this, and Table 1 shows the distribution of preferences for those respondents who listed at least a rst choice (which was just over 90% of all ACRS99 respondents).
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It is immediately clear that an overall majority (55%) favoured direct election. Moreover, a large majority of supporters of both other groups (i.e. both those favouring parliamentary appointment and those favouring retaining the Queen as head of state) had direct election as their second preference. Overall, in fact, direct election was the third preference of less than 10% of respondents. A consequence is that there was no 'cycling' evident at the referendum. The rational choice analysis in Mitchell (2000) , showing that preferences over the republic issue were single-peaked, provides further support for this conclusion.
McAllister (2000) argues that it might be dif cult to nd an accommodation between voters' preferences for direct election and those of political elites for something like parliamentary appointment, and both Higley and Evans Case (2000) and Tranter (2000) also suggest that a direct-election option will continue to be unacceptable to political elites. It is true that, since direct election was not an available option in the referendum, the support for it has not been subjected to a stringent test. Also, public opinion can be modi ed by carefully structured, lengthy campaigns. Nevertheless, the fact that so few respondents placed direct election as their least-preferred option does quite strongly suggest to me that a successful outcome will need to involve some sort of direct-election model, even if one with a tightly circumscribed role for a President. Moving on to consider the referendum vote, as well as the majority support for a republic, 70% of ACRS99 respondents strongly agreed with the statement that 'Our head of state should be an Australian' (and a further 19% agreed, with less than 3% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing). In the light of these overwhelming majorities, what was the key to obtaining the apparently unlikely 'No' vote in the referendum?
Fundamental to this must be the association between referendum vote and head of state preference order. Other things being equal, rst preferences for parliamentary appointment and retaining the Queen should go together with 'Yes' and 'No' votes, respectively. In the case of a rst preference for direct election, we would anticipate that the second preference would usually determine the vote, although other considerations such as tactical voting or partisan in uences might be important enough for some voters to lead to apparent inconsistencies between head of state preferences and vote.
For the most part, voting actually was consistent with head of state preference for those whose rst preference was either parliamentary appointment or retention of the Queen and Governor-General (see Table 2 ). Particularly among the direct electionists, however, there were some apparent inconsistencies. The most notable of these is that 17% of those with the direct election/Queen preference order nevertheless voted in favour, in spite of the fact that a successful referendum outcome would have given them neither of these preferences. Other factors such as partisan in uences (examined below) are a probable explanation for this inconsistency.
In numerical terms, this group is roughly counterbalanced by the 16% of direct election/Parliament respondents who voted against the proposal. In this case, the inconsistency might be explained by tactical voting, i.e. these voters might have believed that direct election would be a future possibility as long as the 1999 proposal was defeated.
The signi cance of direct electionists in defeating the referendum is highlighted by the fact that just over half of the 'No' vote apparently came from this source. This clearly demonstrates the importance of tactics during the campaign in identifying this group and in persuading its members to vote against the referendum proposal. It is therefore a primary task in explaining the referendum outcome to understand what factors distinguish the group. Consequently, in the rest of this article I focus on the direct electionists, examining what distinguished those who voted 'No' (and hence were instrumental in defeating the proposal) from those who voted 'Yes'. 
Partisan In uences
Both in the general area of voting behaviour and in the speci c setting of Australian referendum voting, partisan in uences usually play a large part. It had been ALP policy since the early 1990s to support the introduction of a republic by 2001 (the centenary of federation) and, although there had been some divisions within the ALP over the method of selection, their leading federal politicians (including their leader Kim Beazley) supported the referendum proposal. On the other hand, Liberal Party federal politicians were quite divided, though in their case the main division was between those supporting the status quo (including the Prime Minister, John Howard) and those favouring the parliamentary-appointment option (including the Liberal Deputy Leader, Peter Costello). Consequently, to the extent that partisanship in uenced voting, one would expect ALP partisans would have been more likely to support the proposal than Liberal partisans. This has, in fact, been shown to be the case when one considers voters overall, whether partisanship is measured by party identi cation (Charnock 2000; Tranter 2000) or by leader evaluations and 1998 federal election vote (McAllister 2000) . Unlike amongst the party elites, direct electionists predominate amongst voters in all parties 3 (ranging upwards from the 47% among National identi ers: see Table 3 ).
There are, though, some partisan differences amongst the electorate in head of state preferences, and it is not clear a priori that partisanship would in uence referendum voting in the same way when attention is restricted to direct electionists. It would be a plausible suggestion, for example, that the factors that lead voters to be direct electionists would often be powerful enough to override partisan effects.
However, there are clear relationships between party identi cation and referendum vote amongst direct electionists also (see Table 4 ), and they are generally of the same size and direction as those observed when all voters are considered. There is only one that differs in any signi cant way, and that is that Liberal direct electionists were more likely to vote in favour (46%) than were Liberal identi ers generally (36%). Although I have not shown the corresponding analyses here, this is largely a re ection of the corresponding head of state preferences: the second preferences of Liberal direct electionists were more heavily weighted towards parliamentary appointment than were the rst preferences of Liberal identi ers overall.
Clearly, then, partisan in uences were also quite apparent among direct electionists, with ALP identi ers being more likely than Liberal identi ers to vote in favour. The differences are signi cant, but they obviously do not provide a complete explanation of what distinguishes the direct electionists who voted 'No' from those who voted 'Yes', and other factors must also have been important.
Populist Protest
One of the most commonly expressed suggestions for the referendum defeat has been that it re ected a populist protest derived from mistrust of, and dissatisfaction with, politicians and the political process. In the recent general political context, this has often been linked to the economic and social impacts of globalisation and has sometimes been put in the context of an urban-rural cleavage or of a 'cosmopolitans' versus 'parochials' divide involving the notion of a 'new class' composed of an educated, mobile, urban elite (cf Betts 1999 and several of the contributors in Abbott et al 1998) . In the speci c context of the referendum, it is associated with the notion that the republic was an elite issue (see, for example, Higley and Evans Case 2000; McAllister 2000) , an argument which was used very effectively in negative portrayals of Malcolm Turnbull and the Australian Republican Movement during the referendum campaign. If these suggestions are accurate, then there should be both sociodemographic and attitudinal differences apparent in voting at the referendum. For example, groups said to suffer from the impact of globalisation, such as rural dwellers, those on lower incomes, those with lower levels of formal education and in lower status occupations should have been less likely to vote in favour of the referendum proposal. The same should be true for those with lower levels of trust and belief in the ef cacy of the political process.
With respect to the sociodemographic effects (see Table 5 ), some of these aspects do distinguish the two groups of direct electionists from each other, with rural residence, non-possession of higher educational quali cations and being in lower status occupations all increasing the chances of voting 'No'. However, many other differences are small or non-existent, and it is also noteworthy that the only differences that are larger for direct electionists than for voters as a whole are based on country of birth (speci cally, those for the Australian-and Southern Europeanborn). The 'republic as elite initiative' hypothesis is quite strongly supported by the responses to the question about the republic debate being a distraction from real problems, with the direct electionists who voted against the referendum being much more likely to agree that it was a distraction (see Table 6 ). 4 Clearly, proponents of a republic will need to argue the positive merits of the proposal better in future if voters such as these are to be persuaded to support the idea.
On the other hand, although there is a tendency for the direct electionists who voted 'No' to have somewhat lower levels of ef cacy and trust, the differences are generally small. Consequently, these factors are not useful for distinguishing the two groups of direct electionists from each other. This is noteworthy: although a reaction to the republic issue in particular was signi cant, it appears that a more generalised political dissatisfaction was not an important distinguishing factor, contrary to many previous suggestions.
In passing, I note one particularly ironic feature of the referendum outcome. Compared with 'Yes' voters, among the 'No' voters there was a disproportionate number of people who said they de nitely or probably would not have voted had it not been compulsory to do so. Consequently, the question would have come much closer to obtaining an overall majority if voting had not been compulsory (and may even have passed). This is rather ironic, since Senator Minchin played such a key role in the 'No' campaign, yet is also well known for his opposition to compulsory voting.
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National Identity
Given the nature of the referendum proposal and the main theme of the 'Yes' campaigners (' "Yes" for our republic and an Australian head of state'), issues about the nature of Australian national identity are obviously likely to have been critical for some people. In some cases this would come from aspects that might be directly related to the proposal: among these would be attachments to the historic ties with Britain (including to the Queen and royal family) and to symbols such as the national ag and national anthem. 6 In addition to these aspects that were directly related to the proposal, there are more diffuse ones that form part of questions about the nature of Australian national identity. In this vein, Warhurst (1993, 100) argues that 'for Australia the question of a republic is a nationalist issue' and quotes Bob Hawke (Labor Prime Minister from 1983 to 1991) as having said during his 1979 Boyer Lectures that 'for reasons of national identity I would prefer to break the link with the British Crown' (Warhurst 1993, 115) .
More recently, Paul Keating has been seen as having driven the debate about national identity during his years as Prime Minister and this has also been argued 4 The fact that fewer than half of enrolled voters voted in the non-compulsory ballot for the elected delegates to the 1998 Constitutional Convention could be taken as additional evidence of lack of widespread enthusiasm. 5 He was, for example, a key member of the Coalition majority on the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters that recommended the abolition of compulsory voting at federal elections and referendums following the Coalition's win in the 1996 federal election. 6 Although neither the ag nor the national anthem would have changed as a result of a successful referendum vote, there were substantial minorities (of 24% and 18%, respectively) who incorrectly thought they would change. distraction from real problems
Note:
As described in the note to as intimately connected with the republic debate (eg Leithner 1994) . Following Keating's initiatives, the range of the debate was broadened to include people's attitudes to Aboriginal issues, immigrants and multiculturalism. Empirical support for the existence of connections between the republic issue and these aspects amongst the Australian electorate is provided by Jackman (1998), who nds not only that questions about Aboriginal and immigrant issues load together on the same (racial) dimension, but also that this dimension is fairly highly correlated with a republican dimension.
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Several of these aspects were apparent in voting at the referendum and are re ected in Table 7 . The largest differences involve those who are more conservative on constitutional ties with Britain and the Queen and on symbols such as the ag. Such people are considerably more common among the direct electionists who voted 'No' than among those who voted 'Yes', and this seems to be one of the most signi cant factors differentiating the two groups of direct electionists.
At rst sight, this is somewhat contradictory: on the one hand, the expressed attitudes of this group are quite conservative (which helps to explain their 'No' vote), but on the other hand their preference for direct election as rst choice expresses support for what would potentially be a very radical change. It could, however, be taken to support the notion of a protest vote among the members of the group. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact (noted previously) that those in the group were much more likely to think the republic debate was a distraction from real problems.
However, since the source of such a protest does not (based on the analysis above) appear to be a generalised political dissatisfaction, it is necessary to identify what the source might be. Analyses in both Charnock (1999) and McAllister and Bean (2000) suggest that attitudes towards immigrants and Aborigines played an important role in attracting voters to the One Nation Party at the 1998 federal election. Combined with Jackman's (1998) conclusions mentioned above, this suggests that at least a partial source for the protest vote is likely to be found in some of the more diffuse aspects of national identity.
As Table 7 shows quite clearly, questions about things such as attitudes towards immigrants do indeed serve to differentiate direct electionists who voted against from those who voted in favour, with the former having more negative attitudes. Taken together with the signi cant country of birth differences noted earlier, this suggests that a more extensive examination of the role of national identity is likely to provide some valuable insights into voting behaviour at the referendum (and also possibly have some relevance for understanding the sources of recent protest voting more generally).
Phillips (1998) provides a useful review of recent quantitative survey research in the area of Australian national identity, nding just over 10 studies.
8 Of particular 7 The qualitative research reported in Phillips and Smith (2000) suggests that any changes in perceptions of Australian identity over the period had been quite minor and this supports the view that the republic debate generally (not just the referendum campaign) had little effect on these perceptions. 8 In an international context, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) tried for several years to develop suitable modules for their cross-national studies (Svallfors 1996) and eventually the 1995 round of ISSP surveys included some relevant modules. As in previous rounds, the Australian contribution to this was provided by the National Social Science Survey (Kelley et al 1995) ; several of the relevant questionsfrom the modules were also included in the 1996 Australian Election Study (Jones, McAllister and Gow 1996) and some were included in ACRS99. interest here are some analyses of responses to people's conceptions of what aspects are important in being 'truly Australian'. 9 McAllister (1997) concluded that achieved rather than ascribed attributes were overall rated as more important, while Jones (1997) derived a typology of Australians based on their responses. Using factor analysis, he found that the aspects could be subdivided into three scales, one involving ascribed attributes (being Australian-born, Christian and having lived in Australia for most of one's life) and which he described as measuring an Australian nativism dimension, the second (based on feeling Australian and respecting Australian laws and political institutions) which he described as measuring an affective dimension of civic culture and a third (based on possessing citizenship and being able to speak English) which he found acted as a behavioural bridge between the other two dimensions and which he described as measuring an instrumental dimension of civic culture. Based on the rst two of these scales he identi ed four main groups within the population, which he named as follows: Dogmatic Nativists: strong nativism and strong affective civic culture; Literal Nativists: strong nativism and weak to moderate affective civic culture; Civic Nationalists: weak to moderate nativism and strong affective civic culture; Moderate Pluralists: weak to moderate on both nativism and affective civic culture.
In the context of the republic referendum, this typology 10 can be used to add some analytic precision to some of the previous explanations and also to add a new dimension. For example, it seems to provide a more careful empirical investigation into some important aspects of the arguments used by Betts (1999) , especially of the distinction between 'cosmopolitans' and 'parochials'. In this framework, one would probably associate the 'cosmopolitans' most closely with the 'moderate pluralists': if the suggestion that the republic referendum was mainly important to mobile, urban, educated elites is accurate, then this group should have been more likely to vote 'Yes'. On the other hand, at face value (based on nationalist sentiment) one would expect nativists to have been more likely to support the referendum ('an Australian head of state'), so failure to do so would indicate the kind of protest mentioned above.
In fact, a straightforward examination (see Table 8 In ACRS99 the respective sizes of the groups were Dogmatic Nativists (16%), Literal Nativists (6%), Civic Nationalists(39%) and Moderate Pluralists (39%). This distributionis almost identicalto that found by Jones (1997) in his analysis of the NSSS95. direct electionists (as well as among voters as a whole) the two nativist groups were considerably more likely to have voted against the referendum proposal. Perceptions of national identity are, therefore, quite effective in distinguishing the two groups of direct electionists from each other.
As the lower section of Table 8 indicates, while the nativist groups were more likely than the two other identity groups to favour retaining the status quo, a majority of both nativist groups actually selected direct election as their rst choice (and, in fact, the Literal Nativists had the highest percentage of direct electionists among all of the four groups). In addition, members of both groups of nativists were extremely unlikely to select parliamentary appointment as rst preference. This again seems to support a protest vote interpretation.
Reinforcing this even more, analyses (not shown here) that also incorporate party identi cation show that, while ALP identi ers in the Civic Nationalist and Moderate Pluralist groups were considerably more likely than Coalition identi ers to select parliamentary appointment as rst preference, there was no such difference among the nativist groups. This further suggests that the nativist aspect is associated with protest voting, with nativism negating the (positive) ALP partisan effect on voting 'Yes'.
What is the source of this protest vote? Does it derive from generalised political dissatisfaction or from something more speci c, such as a reaction against the perceived special treatment of Aborigines and immigrants and the notion of a multicultural society? The large attitudinal variations apparent in Table 9 support the latter explanation. There are large contrasts between the groups, with the Moderate Pluralists and Dogmatic Nativists tending to be at opposite poles.
11 The former have a much weaker attachment to Australia than the other groups, and they are generally the least conservative. They are also more likely to have an individualistic view of society. In contrast, the Dogmatic Nativists are the most strongly attached to Australia, are the most conservative and have the most community-oriented view of society. There are also signi cant differences in attitudes towards immigrants and Aborigines.
The sociodemographic backgrounds of the Moderate Pluralists and Civic Nationalists are very similar to each other (see Table 10 ), including having the highest education levels and occupational status. One notable exception to this is in residential location, where it is the Literal Nativist and Moderate Pluralist groups that are more likely to live in large towns and cities; for direct electionists, therefore, the affective civic culture dimension seems more important than the nativism one in differentiating between areas of residence.
Some aspects of the backgrounds of the two nativist groups are quite similar, although the Dogmatic Nativists among the direct electionists have a number of indicators of having the lowest socioeconomic status (income levels, education levels, occupational status and working-class self-identi cation). Some of these (such as in the areas of education and income) are probably related to the older ages of the Dogmatic Nativists (half of whom were aged over 50 years). A surprising feature is that the nativist groups are more likely to be female (particularly the Literal Nativists, only 40% of whom are male).
There are some large differences in ancestry backgrounds between the identity 11 The same is also true among all respondents (Charnock 2000, table 7 ). 
Note:
As described in the note to 
As described in the note to groups, with both nativist groups being considerably more likely to be Australianborn, especially third generation. The fact that there is little difference between rst-and second-generation distributions of national identity categories suggests that having at least one overseas-born parent has a signi cant effect on attitudes about national identity.
Religious attachment (whether measured by religious denomination or attendance) is much more likely to be present among both nativist groups, and about a quarter of both Moderate Pluralist and Civic Nationalist groups state they have no religion. This has a parallel in partisan attachments, with some practically signi cant variations in levels of major party identi cation (around 85% in the nativist groups and 75% in the others) that result mainly from differences in levels of non-identi cation.
When considered in conjunction with the differences in education levels and the fact that the area of residence variations cut across the nativism dimension, this indicates that an interpretation in terms of values is more appropriate in aiding understanding of the referendum's defeat than is one based on an urban-rural divide.
All of this supports the conclusion that there was a signi cant element of protest among the nativist groups resulting from a reaction against the 'republic as elite initiative' perception. We have seen that these groups are disproportionately third-generation Australian and appear to have a vision of society which is more assimilationist and antagonistic towards multiculturalism. Consequently, another distinguishing feature is that their discontent is expressed in more negative attitudes towards perceived special treatment of immigrants and Aborigines. As before, it was these speci c attitudes, rather than a generalised sense of political dissatisfaction, that best help to explain the protest vote.
Multivariate Analyses
Separate analyses of the different factors, then, show that partisanship, populist protest in reaction to perceptions that the issue was driven by elites, and conceptions of national identity and ancestry all help to distinguish the direct electionists who did not support the referendum from those who did. However, a generalised political dissatisfaction did not do so, and the protest vote seems to be connected to some aspects of the national identity and ancestry component.
Multivariate analysis that takes many factors simultaneously into account con rms these ndings (see Table 11 ). The strongest effect of any single variable was that for party identi cation, with ALP identi cation making direct electionists more likely to vote in favour than other direct electionists. National identity also showed a signi cant effect, with nativist groups among the direct electionists being less likely to support the proposal than the other identity groups. In addition to an indirect impact through these national-identity perceptions, country of birth also had a direct effect, with Southern European-born direct electionists being much more likely to support the proposal than the Australian-born or British-born. The signi cance of this 'cluster' of variables related to national identity and ancestry is emphasised by the effect of attitudes towards both migrants and retaining ties to Britain, with the former also being capable of being interpreted as forming part of the anti-elite reaction. Interestingly, attitudes towards Aborigines are not signi cant; this is probably because negative attitudes in the area are widespread and hence do not serve to differentiate the groups as well as do those towards immigrants.
When the in uences of other variables are controlled for, only two of the sociodemographic variables (religious denomination and education level) were signi cant in distinguishing the two groups of direct electionists from each other, and both could be interpreted in terms of values. The largest effect was for possession of higher education quali cations, which made direct electionists more likely to vote 'Yes'. In the case of religion, although having a stated af liation with a religious denomination generally increased the chances of voting 'No' compared with secularists who rejected a religious denomination of any kind, few are by statistically signi cant amounts, and one (Orthodox) is actually in the opposite direction (re-emphasising the signi cance of ethnic in uences).
Although age, area of residence, self-identi ed social class and generalised political dissatisfaction were all signi cant in distinguishing 'Yes' from 'No' voters overall (Charnock 2000, table 10 ), none of them were important for distinguishing among direct electionists. Furthermore, the religious denomination effects are much smaller among direct electionists. These comparisons suggest that, in interpreting the impact of social background effects on differentiating direct electionists who voted 'No', a values-based interpretation deriving from education in uences is the one that is more fundamental.
Conclusion and Prospects
The analyses presented here of voters' preferences for head of state selection methods clearly show that the republic referendum was defeated only because of the votes of a large proportion (almost half) of the direct electionists. It appears, in fact, that slightly over half of the 'No' vote actually came from this source. Consequently, in terms of tactics, identi cation of the group of direct electionists who voted against the proposal was crucial, and an understanding of the features that distinguished this group from other direct electionists is essential to assessing future prospects.
There seem to be three main aspects that were relevant, two of which are interrelated. The strongest is the traditionally important in uence of partisanship: the role of the political parties was signi cant, with a proportion of voters apparently following their parties or party leaders against their own expressed head of state preference. Since it seems probable that future Liberal leaders will be more likely than Mr Howard to support a republic, this factor will probably be more favourable to a republic in future.
There was another set of in uences that was almost as strong as partisanship, ones that are related to conceptions of national identity and ancestry. Drawing on a typology developed by Jones (1997) that divides the population into four groups on the basis of their perceptions of national identity, I have shown that the association between the referendum vote and these identity groups was quite strong, being not much weaker than that between the vote and party identi cation. The nature of the association was that those groups that were strongly nativist were considerably more likely to vote 'No' than were the others. This suggests a protest vote, because prima facie one would have expected strong nativists to be most in support of having an Australian as head of state.
However, the source of this protest does not appear to be a sense of generalised political dissatisfaction. Rather, it seems to result from fundamental differences in social perceptions. The nativist groups are disproportionately third-generation Australian and have a vision of Australian society which is assimilationist. As a result, their discontent is also expressed in negative attitudes towards perceived special treatment of immigrants and Aborigines and one could (at least partly) interpret their protest vote as a reaction resulting from their view of multiculturalism. It seems unlikely that these groups would change this perspective, and would certainly not do so quickly. They do, however, make up less than a quarter of the population and almost half were aged over 50 years.
Furthermore, as far as the ancestry part of the set of in uences is concerned, the British-born component of the migrant intake has declined sharply since the mid-1970s. Consequently, the impact of the British-born (which is in favour of a 'No' vote) will presumably diminish over time. Overall, the changes in source countries for migrants are likely to be more favourable to a 'Yes' vote in future.
Unquestionably, the hypothesis that there was an element of protest as a reaction against a perception of the republic as an elite initiative is supported by this analysis. As already argued, this reaction was not a product of generalised political dissatisfaction (at least as far as distinguishing the direct electionists who voted against from those who voted in favour is concerned). A focus on values, both on those related to education and on those involved in the differing conceptions of national identity held by the nativist groups, gives a more accurate re ection of the causes. There is some avour of a 'cosmopolitans'-'parochials' distinction, but this lacks the analytical clarity and rigour of the national identity typology. A simplistic spatial distinction based on a divide between major cities and other areas is inadequate because it ignores important associated differences in social composition: for example, immigrants are disproportionately concentrated in major cities (many countries of birth have concentrations in major cities of well over 90%) while, conversely, the Australian-born are disproportionately located outside major cities.
Some of the ideas about the relationship between nativism and the protest vote could probably also be usefully applied to a more general voting context, and they do appear to help in understanding the One Nation phenomenon. However, despite the possibilities offered by preferential voting methods, voters would arguably be more likely to exercise such a protest in the setting of a referendum (especially one that appeared to have mainly symbolic effect) than they would be at a federal election.
Given the existence of this protest factor, it seems that the then-forthcoming centenary of federation and the new millennium provided a context that made the 1999 referendum a relatively easy opportunity for supporters of a republic to succeed. Having failed, future attempts will require much more careful thought, information campaigns and persuasion. The argument that an accommodation between the political elites and the electorate might be hard to nd does need to be taken seriously but, on balance, I think it most likely that some kind of direct-election method will eventuate in due course (with suf ciently tightly circumscribed roles and powers for the President to satisfy the political elites). Achieving the outcome would be helped by using a multistage process (such as the one currently proposed by the ALP, ie an indicative vote for a republic, followed by discussion and selection of a model or models), since this would allow different coalitions of supporters to be formed at each stage.
